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The Outrageous Government Conduct 
Defense: An Interpretive Argument for Its 
Application by SCOTUS 
by EVE A. ZELINGER*
Introduction 
Helen Miller and her friend posed as stranded travelers in the Los 
Angeles airport in 1983.1  Seemingly helpless, Miller and her friend cajoled 
a suspected heroin user, Darnell Simpson, to give them a ride into town.2
Soon after, Miller and Simpson became sexually intimate and Miller 
introduced Simpson to a “friend” who was interested in buying heroin and 
who subsequently made several purchases.3  Little did Simpson know, the 
women were FBI-employed informants.4  At the time, the FBI knew Miller 
was a prostitute, heroin user, and a Canadian fugitive facing drug charges.5
Simpson was subsequently arrested and indicted on various drug charges.  
The FBI agreed to allow Miller to keep a $10,000 profit from one of the sales 
she arranged which resulted in Simpson’s arrest.6  In his trial, Simpson raised 
the defense that the government’s conduct was so outrageous that it violated 
his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, thus requiring dismissal.7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his defense, concluding that the 
law enforcement conduct was not so “outrageous” as to justify dismissal.8  If 
law enforcement officers are allowed to utilize prostitution, heroin use, and 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2014, 
Dartmouth College.  Special thanks to Professor Rory Little for the inspiration and to Professor 
Kate Bloch for the support and guidance.  I thank all the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law 
Quarterly for their editorial assistance.   
1. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991).  
2. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1463 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 3.  Simpson, 927 F.2d at 1088–89.  
 4.  Id.
 5.  Id.
 6.  Id.
 7.  Id.
 8.  Id.
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international fugitives to profit from the sale of drugs, what does it take to 
meet the standard of Outrageous Government Conduct (“OGC”)? 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects 
defendants from OGC via the OGC defense,9 but the Court has not yet been 
presented with a set of facts it believes warrants its application.  As a result, 
the Court has not set forth such criteria for application of the OGC defense, 
leaving the lower courts to apply their own standards.  The Supreme Court 
would fulfill its key role to establish, standardize, and enhance respect for 
the rule of law by creating a uniform federal standard.  By establishing the 
limits of acceptable law enforcement actions, the Court would assert its 
historic leadership role, affirming cultural norms consistent with the 
fundamental precepts of the U.S. Constitution.10
This Note will (i) advocate for the application of the OGC defense to 
appropriate facts and circumstances, (ii) outline the facts and circumstances 
where the lower federal, as well as state, courts have applied the OGC 
defense, and (iii) argue for the Supreme Court’s clarification of standards to 
guide lower courts’ application of the facts and circumstances that constitute 
OGC, i.e., where law enforcement action rises to the level of a violation of 
Fifth Amendment Due Process protection. 
Section I of this Note discusses the history of the OGC defense, defines 
what it is, and explains why it is needed, especially in jurisdictions that have 
adopted the subjective entrapment test.  Section II provides context and 
interprets judicial decisions, including where federal district, appellate, and 
state courts have granted defendants relief by reversal of a conviction or 
dismissal of charges based on the OGC defense.  Section III highlights 
prominent cases where the U.S. Supreme Court was directly presented with 
the OGC defense and rejected its application, and explores the Court’s 
rationale.  Section IV discusses the bases upon which the U.S. Supreme 
Court might apply the OGC defense, and argues that the Court should apply 
the defense notwithstanding its failure to do so in any prior decision.
I.  What is Outrageous Government Conduct and Why are We 
Talking About it? 
A.  Brief History of the OGC Defense 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes State 
Government conduct and “empowers the Court to nullify any state law if its 
 9.  Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).  
 10.  See infra notes 196-199.
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application ‘shocks the conscience,’ offends ‘a sense of justice’ or runs 
counter to the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’”11  The OGC defense is based 
on these very principles, as incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which mandates every citizen’s right to due process of 
law.  In its definition of OGC, the Court applied the “shock the conscience” 
Fourteenth Amendment due process principles from Rochin12 in the context 
of the Fifth Amendment.  In doing so, the Court poses the question: in what 
instances has law enforcement acted so outrageously that the Court, 
imposing a sentence so severe (or one at all), would fail “to provide the 
defendant with [his] claimed [Constitutional] protection”13 and would 
“den[y] fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.”14
To date, the Supreme Court has not yet found sufficiently outrageous 
conduct by law enforcement to warrant a due process violation.15
The theory behind the OGC defense is that actions taken by law 
enforcement, including prosecutors, may be so offensive that they amount to 
a violation of an individual’s right to Fifth Amendment Due Process.  
Procedurally, the defense is usually raised in a pretrial motion to dismiss,16
where, if successful, the OGC claim may result in dismissal of an indictment.  
The OGC defense is often conflated with an affirmative entrapment defense.  
This is in large part because the defense has principles of entrapment 
embedded in its veins, and the two are in many ways inextricably linked.  
However, there are important distinctions between the two defenses. 
 11.  See Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 211 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) 
(holding the State’s forcing of emetics upon a defendant a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment).   
 12.  The Court in Rochin established a standard, later known as substantive due process.  342 
U.S. 165 (1952).  Substantive due process can be encapsulated by the question, “when did police 
actions so invade the individual liberty of a suspect that the government should not be allowed to 
utilize the evidentiary fruits of those actions?”  Jerold H. Israel, Free-standing Due Process and 
Criminal Procedure: Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J 303, 
353 n.2 (2001).  Coerced confessions would also fall under this category.  
 13.  Israel, supra note 12, at 353–354 n.2. 
 14.  Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), vacated on other grounds.
 15.  Furthermore, there have been a limited number of cases where the OGC defense has been 
squarely presented to the Court. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).   
 16.  The way in which the defense can be raised and decided procedurally may detrimentally 
affect its success. See, FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 12(b) (the defense may be waived if not raised prior 
to trial); see also infra note 167.   
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1.  What is Entrapment? 
Entrapment is a complete defense to a criminal charge.17  The 
entrapment defense, like the OGC defense, often stems from operations 
involving undercover agents and informants.  For many years, defense 
attorneys were limited to the entrapment defense18 when representing clients 
who were victims to these scenarios.  The underlying logic behind an 
entrapment defense is that, absent government action, the defendant likely 
would not have engaged in the charged conduct.19  Theoretically, in the U.S. 
justice system, every individual is held accountable for his actions, which 
includes refraining from acting upon a desire to commit a crime, even when 
an opportunity arises.20  While each individual is held to this standard, there 
are protections in place for individuals who are subjected to the “conception 
and planning of an offense by an officer”21 where the individual who 
committed the crime charged would not have done so, but “for the trickery, 
persuasion, or fraud of the officer.”22
The Supreme Court recognized the Entrapment defense in Sorrells v. 
United States23 in 1932, and the defense was developed in Sherman v. United 
States24 in 1958.  In both cases, the Justices agreed that the successful 
outcome of the defense should be to bar prosecution, but they could not agree 
 17.  Criminal Resource Manual, 645. Entrapment—Elements, OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-645-entrapment-elements (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2018).  
 18.  The entrapment defense was born in Sorrells in 1932.  Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435, 454 (1932).   
 19.  Id.
 20.  An OGC defense can be distinguished from the most commonly adopted version of the 
entrapment defense, in that a defendant’s predisposition to commit a crime is usually irrelevant for 
an OGC analysis.  Rather, it is the government’s conduct, standing alone, that is examined; cf.
United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744, 751 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“Just as a defendant’s 
lack of prior criminal involvement is relevant to an entrapment defense, so too is it relevant to a 
claim of outrageous government conduct. In neither case is it dispositive, but it is highly relevant 
to the issue of whether the defendant or the government should ultimately be held accountable for 
the instigation of the crime.”).   
 21.  Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454 (Sorrells was the first case where justices accepted the 
entrapment defense and therein, outlined its guiding principles.  The case centered on an undercover 
officer’s relationship with the defendant during the Prohibition era.  When the two men were at 
Sorrells’ home, the agent asked twice whether Sorrells had any liquor.  After Sorrells informed the 
agent that he did not, the informant asked Sorrells if he would be willing to purchase liquor for him.  
After Sorrells agreed and complied with the request, he was convicted under the Prohibition Act.).  
 22.  Id.
 23.  Id.
 24.  Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 371 (1958). 
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on the method to accomplish it.25  Consequently, the entrapment defense has 
two tests, one objective and the other subjective, both of which often lead to 
the same result.
2.  Divergent Entrapment Tests: Subjective vs. Objective 
The objective test, referred to as Justice Frankfurter’s approach and 
outlined in his Sherman concurrence, is a question for judges as a matter of 
law and focuses on the egregiousness of actions taken by law enforcement, 
based on the time and effort invested, irrespective of a defendant’s 
predisposition to commit a crime.26
The Supreme Court majority in Sherman employed the subjective test, 
analyzing entrapment from the perspective of the suspect and requiring (1) 
creative government inducement for criminal activity and (2) a lack of 
predisposition by the defendant to commit the crime for a successful 
defense.27  In Sherman, a government informant and a defendant accidentally 
met at a doctor’s office, where both were being treated for a narcotics 
addiction.28  The informant asked the defendant to supply him with narcotics 
for his own use.29  The defendant at first ignored the informant but, after 
repeated requests, complied and unknowingly accepted government money 
in exchange for the narcotics.30  The prosecution charged the defendant with 
the illegal sale of narcotics and, at his trial, the defendant invoked the 
affirmative entrapment defense.31  The Court unanimously overturned the 
conviction,32 deciding that the government could not make such use of an 
informant and then claim disassociation through ignorance.33
The focus of the subjective test is generally not on the conduct itself as 
both parties acknowledge that the conduct occurred and is indeed otherwise 
criminal.  The focus, instead, is on whether law enforcement, through the 
actions of its agents, induced an individual to commit the crime.34  “Mere 
 25.  See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371; Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
 26.  Alaska, California, Hawaii, Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and 
West Virginia all employ the objective entrapment standard.  Ray Rigat, The Trap of Entrapment,
THE RIGAT L. FIRM BLOG (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.rigatlaw.com/blog/2016/11/02/the-trap-of-
entrapment/.  
 27.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373.  
 28.  Id.
 29.  Id. at 369.  
 30.  Id.
 31.  Id. at 372. 
 32.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378.  
 33.  Id. at 376. 
 34.  OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, supra note 17. 
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solicitation to commit a crime is not inducement.”35  Rather, inducement 
centers on one’s predisposition.  The key question regarding predisposition 
is whether the defendant “was an unwary innocent or, instead, an unwary 
criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the 
crime.”36  In other words, if the defendant likely would have committed the 
crime, without law enforcement’s inducement, he is “predisposed.”37  If, 
though, by law enforcement’s stimulus or encouragement, i.e., “when the 
criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity38 of law-
enforcement officials,”39 one commits a crime that he otherwise would not 
have committed, the defendant is not predisposed.40  If the Court, or in some 
instances a jury, finds predisposition, the subjective entrapment defense 
fails.41  The Supreme Court has affirmed the subjective test of entrapment 
and the majority of lower courts have followed suit. 
3.  Weaknesses of the Subjective Test 
What at first may appear to be a relief for a defendant who is at the 
mercy of government officials who induced him to commit a crime, the 
subjective entrapment test may be as deceptive as the practices used to 
employ it.  This test has two main issues: (1) the burden and prejudice against 
defendants by its use and (2) its futility in conditioning the future behavior 
of authorities.  By its very nature, the subjective entrapment test fails upon a 
finding of predisposition.  Therefore, an otherwise irrelevant criminal history 
and rap sheet42 becomes central to the question of whether the entrapment 
defense applies to a defendant.  Although in other contexts, evidentiary 
issues bar a criminal record from entering the courtroom to stave off 
improper use of character evidence, for entrapment, the court often makes a 
finding of predisposition through criminal records.43  Consequently, a 
 35.  Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
 36.  OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, supra note 17 (quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 
58, 63 (1988)).  
 37.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.  
 38.  See Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (the first case where justices accepted entrapment as a 
defense and provided guiding principles on its use).
 39.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
 40.  Id. at 371. 
 41.  This is one place in the system where protections afforded by the OGC defense are 
necessary.
 42.  Also known as a criminal record.  
 43.  “It allows the prosecution, in offering such proof, to rely on the defendant’s bad reputation 
or past criminal activities, including even rumored activities of which the prosecution may have 
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defendant’s prior history may, in some instances, be exposed improperly to 
a jury as it decides his fate.  The procedural necessity to disclose a 
defendant’s past in hopes of an acquittal, on the theory of entrapment, is not 
only a burden for the defense but may also prejudice the defendant.44  “The 
jury may well consider such evidence as probative not simply of the 
defendant’s predisposition, but of his guilt of the offense to which he stands 
charged.”45  Furthermore, because a finding of predisposition is central to the 
success of the subjective entrapment test, there is little incentive for police 
to change their tactics because a finding of entrapment does not hinge on 
their behavior.  In other words, when considering the entrapment defense, 
the government need not worry that its acts will impact the outcome of its 
case46 and, consequently, has little incentive to alter its behavior going 
forward.47
4.  The Use of the Entrapment Test in Courts: Subjective vs. Objective 
Critics contend there is no use for the OGC defense due to the 
availability of the entrapment defense.  When comparing the OGC defense 
to the objective entrapment test, their point is well taken.  Under the objective 
test, it is irrelevant whether a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime.  
Rather, it is the law enforcement’s conduct, alone, that is examined.  This 
isolated test is the same substantive test that should be employed under an 
OGC analysis.  However, the objective test of entrapment, which requires a 
case-by-case determination of facts, is used in a select minority of lower 
federal and state courts.48  The subjective test is used by most courts when 
entertaining the entrapment defense.49  Consequently, it is vital that the OGC 
insufficient evidence to obtain an indictment, and to present the agent’s suspicions as to why they 
chose to tempt this defendant.”  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973).
 44.  While a judge may give the jury instructions not to use the criminal history as improper 
character evidence in these scenarios, who is to say that juries do not calculate that evidence into 
their determination of a defendant’s guilt.  
 45.  Russell, 411 U.S. at 443.  
 46.  Though it may not affect their case, it is true that government officials are not immune 
from lawsuits, such as 1983 suits, which make it unlawful for the authorities to deprive an 
individual of his rights under federal law or the Constitution.  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 47.  See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  
The Court may act “to implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized statutory or 
constitutional right; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate 
considerations validly before a jury; and to deter future illegal conduct.”  Id. at 1085 (quoting 
United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (1991)).   
 48.  Rigat, supra note 26. 
 49.  Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53
(1986).
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defense remain an available option for all defendants, especially in those 
states that employ the subjective entrapment test. 
B.  What is the OGC Defense and How is it Different From 
Entrapment?
The OGC defense generally reflects the Frankfurter objective test,50
focusing on the egregiousness of law enforcement conduct, yet is distinct 
from the subjective entrapment approach.  While there are many similarities 
between the entrapment defense and the OGC defense, there are also a few 
key distinctions. 
First, there are procedural differences: entrapment is an affirmative 
defense, whereas an OGC defense is a bar to prosecution.  For entrapment, 
the availability of relief (i.e., reversal of a defendant’s conviction) is 
determined throughout the trial process, whereas, an OGC defense is raised 
by motion to the court before trial begins.  Second, the OGC defense “is 
distinct from the entrapment defense in that it raises a question of law for the 
court,”51 meaning that the issue of whether the defense should apply is left 
exclusively to the judge’s interpretation and application of relevant legal 
principles, consideration of the facts of a given case, and cannot be resolved 
by jury consideration.  Conversely, entrapment solely raises a question of 
fact such that the relevance of the defense must be answered by reference to 
and inferences from facts, the evidence presented, and may be resolved by a 
trier of fact, often a jury.52  The most crucial distinction is that the existence 
of a predisposition to commit a crime is completely destructive to a defense 
of subjective entrapment.  However, it does not eliminate, nor should it 
diminish, the potential to prevail with an OGC defense. 
While the entrapment defense has proved successful in many cases,53 it 
is not always enough to protect defendants, specifically in the states using a 
 50.  See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 371, 383 (1958).
 51.  United States v. McQuin, 613 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding OGC is a question 
of law for the court to consider).  
 52.  People v. Peppars, 140 Cal.App.3d 677, 685 (1983) (“. . . while entrapment presents a 
question of fact, this defense presents a question of law.”) 
 53.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992) (defendant ordered reading 
material from an adult bookstore).  Soon after, Congress passed a law prohibiting child pornography 
sent through the mail.  Id.  Over the next two and a half years, the government investigated the 
defendant’s willingness to break the law by sending him pamphlets and questionnaires, that 
criticized the new law.  Id.  The defendant finally gave in.  Id. The entrapment defense succeeded 
because among other factors, while the defendant may have expressed an interest in the activity 
before, he stopped when it became illegal and had no predisposition to break the law.  Id.; see also
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(where the court found that the defendant was entrapped).  
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subjective entrapment test.54  Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sherman,55
illustrates this very point: 
No matter what the defendant’s past record and present 
inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in 
the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him 
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.56
Ultimately, law enforcement conduct cannot go unchecked even where 
criminally-minded defendants are involved.  The OGC defense born in 
Russell offered that check on law enforcement conduct.  In 1973, the Court 
raised the intriguing possibility that the government’s use of undercover 
agents or informants, and their use of deception, could constitute a due 
process violation.57  The Court acknowledged that the affirmative criminal 
defense of entrapment is distinct from a constitutional claim and left open 
the possibility that the Court may someday accept the OGC defense based 
on constitutional grounds.  Justice Rehnquist optimistically framed this idea, 
stating that the Court “may someday be presented with a situation in which 
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process 
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial 
processes to obtain a conviction.”58 Although the Russell opinion was 
written forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court has yet to find specific facts 
that rise to the Court’s threshold to find OGC.  This may also mean that 
motions have not been appropriately raised to the Court on behalf of 
defendants, notwithstanding evidence of OGC.
The availability of an OGC defense is critical, especially in jurisdictions 
that employ the subjective entrapment test, because it allows a defendant to 
raise OGC (1) when the court will not consider entrapment because there is 
 54.  See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (government agents supplying a key 
ingredient for the manufacture of a controlled substance did not constitute entrapment).
 55.  See generally, Sherman, 356 U.S. 371. 
 56.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383. 
 57.  See generally, Russell, 411 U.S. 423.   
 58.  Id. at 431.  Though, in this case (5-4 split) both the entrapment defense and the due 
process claim failed. Id.  The Court held that the governments contribution of propane to a drug 
ring already in motion was not objectionable as propane was not illegal, despite government efforts 
to restrict its availability to drug rings, in particular.  Id. at 432.  While Rehnquist acknowledged 
the possibility of a successful OGC defense, he himself was not a vehicle for change.  Id. at 423.  
In fact, some might even say, “the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have failed to live up to their 
articulated principles” with respect to a possible OGC defense. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 148 (1997) [hereinafter AMAR 1997].
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predisposition,59 (2) when a defendant fears disclosing to the jury what would 
otherwise be irrelevant and prejudicial prior criminal history,60 and (3) because 
it could condition future behavior by the authorities to refrain from acting 
egregiously.61  Consequently, the courts’ acceptance and granting of an OGC 
defense, even where entrapment might otherwise have applied, benefits both 
defendants and society at large.62  Furthermore, the entrapment defense is 
statutorily construed and can therefore be legislatively withdrawn at anytime.63
California courts have recognized that the OGC defense exists independent of 
the entrapment defense and, in doing so, serves the interests of justice.64  The 
Supreme Court’s adoption and implementation of the OGC defense would 
both clarify the entrapment defense and create a narrow use for the OGC 
defense based on law enforcement conduct standing alone. 
II.  Lower Courts’ Interpretation and Split Regarding the     
OGC Defense 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to grant a motion raising an OGC 
defense, many federal district and circuit courts, as well as some state courts, 
have done so.  “Given the amorphous state of the outrageous government 
conduct defense, and with little guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court as to 
 59.  See United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980).  An OGC defense is 
also available to defendants who may stand no chance with an entrapment claim because they were 
predisposed to the crime; see also People v. Smith, 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1229 (2003) (Werdegar, J., 
concurring) (“but that an area of overlap exists [with a defense of OGC and entrapment] does not 
make either doctrine redundant and provides no reason to doubt that in a proper case of outrageous 
conduct, whether including government inducement to crime, the defendant may be able to obtain 
dismissal of the action on due process grounds.”); see also United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 
(9th Cir. 1986) (majority recognized the potential availability of an OGC defense irrespective of a 
defendant’s predisposition). 
 60.  Which is required for a finding of predisposition and consequently, a determination of 
the subjective entrapment test.  OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, supra note 17. 
 61.  Because predisposition is not usually a factor considered in the determination of the 
viability of an OGC defense.  For example, in the case of bodily invasions, government officials 
know that this type of behavior will not pass a due process violation evaluation and, as a result, 
may refrain from engaging in such practices henceforth.  See generally Rochin v. People of 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 62.  There is a need for the OGC defense, based on constitutional principles, because “the 
Court has failed to build up alternative remedial schemes [to the exclusionary rule, which lacks 
constitutional footing] that would protect innocent people from outrageous searches and seizures 
and would also deter future government abuse.” AMAR 1997, supra note 58, at 148.
 63.  See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432–33 (1973).  
 64.  People v. Holloway, 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 1761 (1996) (“While generally under 
California entrapment law the focus is on whether police instigated or created the crime, other 
overreaching by the police at the investigatory stage could be so outrageous as to taint the 
subsequent arrest.”).  
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its existence or applicability, the lower courts will continue to apply it as they 
see fit in particular cases.”65  The need for Supreme Court guidance as to the 
facts and circumstances where the OGC defense is applicable is evident from 
the lower courts’ patch work application of the defense. 
Karen Snell, a California civil rights attorney with thirty-seven years of 
practice and experience, suggests that for a defendant to succeed on an OGC 
claim, a defendant “must prove that a government player, either an agent or 
prosecutor,66 violated the law.”67  In an effort to distinguish between acts 
these courts deem “not commendable,”68 and acts that constitute OGC such 
that they “violate the universal sense of justice,”69 this Note catalogues a 
variety of cases to decipher patterns, focusing on several cases where the 
entrapment defense was denied due to predisposition, but where an OGC 
defense was considered and accepted. 
Some courts have asserted that the government’s involvement must be 
“malum in se,”70 or, amount to the engineering and direction of the criminal 
enterprise from start to finish.71  Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit,72
have outlined common threads in case law to decipher its applicability.73
Some others, have narrowed their attention, focusing on the degree of police 
participation in the enterprise,74 the level of coercion, violence or brutality,75
the length of government involvement,76 or whether innocent members of 
 65.  Matthew V. Honeywell, What is Outrageous Government Conduct? The Washington 
Supreme Court Knows It When It Sees It: State v. Lively, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV., 690, 691 (1998). 
 66.  This Note focuses on egregious acts committed by government agents.  
 67.  Telephone Interview with Karen Snell, Cal. Civ. Rights Att’y (Feb. 14, 2018).   
 68.  United States v. McQuin, 613 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 69.  United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 70.  Meaning, conduct that is inherently wrong by nature.  MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND 
PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW 534 (6th ed. 2012).  
 71.  United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 72.  The Tenth Circuit has defined two factors addressing when an OGC defense should 
succeed: government creation of the crime and substantial coercion.  Stephen A. Miller, The Case 
for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 305, 321 (1996). 
 73.  See People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (N.Y. 1978) (laying out a four-factor test, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, in which to consider whether an individual’s due process 
rights have been violated).  California appellate courts cite the test, though the test has not been 
fully sanctioned.   
 74.  See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 75.  See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1477 (1983) (finding OGC hinges on the 
infliction of pain or physical or psychological coercion).  
 76.  See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (1998) (finding OGC where the 
government’s participation “was of extremely long duration, lasting approximately two and one-
half years.”). 
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society were threatened.77  While selectively drawing from much of the 
scholarship regarding the OGC defense, this Note differs from that 
scholarship.  This note focuses on the applicability of the defense, the array 
and categories of facts and circumstances deemed by lower federal and state 
courts to support applications of the defense, and uniquely, draws on 
originalist grounds for the conception and application of the OGC defense.
After reviewing a sampling of cases, it is evident that misconduct can 
be ascribed to a variety or combination of factors.78  “There is simply no way 
to reduce the myriad combination of potentially relevant circumstances to a 
neat list of weighted factors without losing too much in the translation.”79
Although there is no litmus test, three factors seem to be most instrumental 
in decisions where a lower court has granted the OGC defense: when (1) 
government contributions are indispensable to the operation,80 (2) 
government acts are aimed at reinvigorating or creating criminal activity for 
the sole purpose of convicting a defendant81 or, (3) government agents 
unnecessarily engage in criminal activity in seeking prosecution.82  For 
situations that are clearly government created fictions, many courts have 
granted the defense.83  In these scenarios, like an entrapment defense, “the 
defense has been permitted upon grounds of public policy, which the courts 
formulate by saying they will not permit their process to be used in aid of a 
scheme for the actual creation of a crime by those whose duty is to deter its 
commission.”84  The chart below illustrates where courts have done just that, 
and outlines various criteria relied on by these courts to grant OGC motions. 
 77.  Miller, supra note 72. 
 78.  Kenneth M. Miller, Outrageous Government Conduct that Shocks the Conscience, 25 
CAL. ATT’YS FOR CRIM. JUST., 81, 83 n. 4 (1998).  
 79.  United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993).  
 80.  See generally United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (where 
the government provided defendant with an otherwise unavailable ingredient); United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (where the government facilitated the crime and had the 
requisite chemical knowledge); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (where the 
government facilitated the crime and offered a key ingredient); People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 
(N.Y. 1978) (where the officers were insistent and overly persistent); State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 
462, 463 (Fla. 1993) (where government manufactured a highly addictive substance).   
 81.  See United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984); Metcalf v. State of Florida, 635 
So. 2d 11 (1994); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (1982).  
 82.  See Lard, 734 F.2d 1290; State of Minnesota v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372 (2009). 
 83.  See United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (1987); Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372. 
 84.  Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 435, 454 (1932). 
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85. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 373 (holding the government’s involvement reached a “demonstrable 
level of outrageousness.”).  
86. Id. at 381 (“The illicit plan did not originate with the criminal defendants”).

























Defendants were convicted on 
multiple drug-related offenses 
for operating a meth lab.  The 
defendant raised money to 
support the lab and oversaw 
distribution, however, the 
informant had complete 
control over the drug lab, 
supplied money, facilities, 
chemicals, and he alone had 
the chemical expertise to 
manufacture meth.  The 
defendants brought an OGC 
defense based on the 
informant’s extreme 
involvement in the enterprise.  
The court granted the OGC 
defense after considering these 
key factors:85
1) the government instigated 
the criminal activity;86
2) the government’s 
contribution was vital to the 
criminal enterprise – money, 
resources, knowledge;87
agents sowed the seeds of the 
conspiracy to entice the 
defendant to commit the crime.  
Yes. The 
entrapment 
defense was not 
available due to 
the defendants 
predisposition
Yes. The court 
factored in that 
there was no 

















A DEA informant partly-
owned a bar in Quito, Ecuador.  
The informant told DEA agents 
about individuals who 
frequented his bar asking for 
cocaine.  The informant visited 
his business associate’s house 
and misrepresented who he 
was while speaking to the 
defendants about the cocaine 
trade.  When the defendants 
claimed they did not have 
money to go through with the 
deal, the informant was 
persistent until the defendant 
Yes Yes. 
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88. United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744, 746–50 (N.D. Cal. 1981).  
89. Id. at 752.  The court also held that the government conduct “was as objectionable as 
coerced confessions and unlawful searches.”  Id. at 750.       
90. Id. at 751.
91.  Without the government’s agent, “set[ting] in motion the operation” the defendants would 
not have engaged in the criminal activity.  Id. at 752.  
92.  The court made note that the government did not contribute to an ongoing operation, but 
instead reinvigorated the process to make a few arrests.  Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 
787 (9th Cir. 1971).
made it happen.  The 
defendants were subsequently 
arrested, while arranging the 
cocaine shipment.88
The court considered several 
factors in granting the OGC 
defense89:
1) informant persuaded the 
defendants to create an 
organization, manufacture a 
crime, and “provided
defendants with an otherwise 
unavailable source of supply
of the illegal drug they were to 
import;”90
2) The government facilitated 
the criminal activity;91
3) Defendants had never before 
imported cocaine and had no 
foreign source of their own and 
were not involved in the drug-
related enterprise until the 










Defendants were charged with 
the illegal manufacturing of 
alcohol. Defendants possessed 
an unregistered distilling 
apparatus and engaged in a 
boot leg whiskey making 
conspiracy.  
The court considered these 
factors in making their 
determination:92
1) The government approached 
the defendants and continued 
to persuade them to produce 
bootleg alcohol;  
2) The government was in 
contact with the defendants for 
an extended period (2.5 years); 
3) The nature of the contact 
was substantial: the 
government offered to provide 
Yes. The 
entrapment 
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equipment, a site, and 
facilitated the criminal 
activity. They provided a 
necessary ingredient (2000 
pounds of sugar at wholesale 
price). And the agent was the 
only customer of the illegal 










Police engaged in misconduct, 
including instigating violence 
and misrepresenting facts to a 
third-party to persuade him to 
cooperate as an informant 
(made him believe he was 
facing a stiff prison sentence). 
The informant then desperately 
sought out individuals who 
could satisfy the government’s 
thirst for a conviction. The 
defendant was among these 
individuals. The informant 
lured the defendant, a 
Pennsylvania resident, to NY 
solely to make a cocaine sale.  
The court dismissed the 
indictment due to the 
egregiousness of the police 
conduct and considered these 
factors in doing so:  
1) The crime would not have 
occurred without active and 
insistent encouragement by the 
police/agent;
2) The police behavior that led 
to the conviction of the 
defendant was deceptive 
(including making him go to 
the border of NY when it was 
not necessary)  
Yes. The 
entrapment 
defense was not 
available.
No. The proper 
focus is whether, 
regardless of the 
defendants’
inclinations or 
criminal intent, the 
Due Process 
clause mandates 











The defendant was arrested for 
allegedly purchasing crack 
cocaine within 1000 feet of a 
school. The crack cocaine 
purchased was illegally 
manufactured by the 
government for sting operation 
use.
No. No.
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93.  State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 1993) (finding the “only appropriate remedy 
to deter outrageous conduct by law enforcement was to bar respondent’s prosecution.”).  
94.  Some of which was lost in the reverse sting, which left the community even more 
vulnerable. Williams, 623 So. 2d at 466.  The highly addictive substance can be distinguished from 
cannabis, a controlled substance.  See generally State v. Brider, 386 So.2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). 
The court granted the OGC 
defense93 considering: 
The government 
manufactured (seized powder 
cocaine and made it into crack 














Defendant was convicted of 
distribution and possession 
with intent to distribute 
cocaine.
The court granted the OGC 
defense considering the 
following:
1) The government agent used 
psychological coercion to get 
the defendant to acquire drugs 
for him;  
2) The government’s sole
motive and intention was to 
overcome obvious reluctance 
by the defendant to commit the 
crime. The agent was not in 
pursuit of stopping crime but 
instead, sought to create it;
3) The defendant had no prior 
criminal record.  
Yes Yes. The 
defendant’s lack 
of predisposition 
to commit any 
crime was among 
many of the 
factors the court 
used to grant the 













The defendant was convicted 
of burglary. The police had 
employed two felons to work 
with the defendant to set up a 
burglary, where the defendant 
acted as a lookout. Government 
agents accomplished the “break 
in.”
The court granted the OGC 
motion because “due process 
barred the state from invoking 
judicial processes to obtain the 













not be convicted if 
the methods 










The defendant was convicted 
of solicitation for purchasing 
cocaine that the police
manufactured into crack for 
No No
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2d 11 
(1994).  
use in a reverse-sting 
operation, within 1000 feet of 
a school.
The court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction 
considering:
1) The government 
manufactured the drugs; and  
2) The purpose of their 
manufacturing was for a 









The defendants (maker and 
abettor) were convicted of 
conspiring to transfer an 
unregistered firearm, a pipe 
bomb. 
The court considered the 
following in granting the OGC 
motion:  
1) The maker was not
predisposed to commit the 
crimes and had no prior 
criminal record. The pipe bomb 
idea only emerged after the 
agent repeatedly pleaded for 
a more powerful; weapon;  
2)The government agents were 
overzealous, including using 
extreme and illegal measures 
to investigate crime, including
smoking marijuana;
3) The governments’ conduct 
was aimed at creating new 
crimes for the sake of 








was used in the 
courts’
determination in 















Minneapolis Police conducted 
an undercover operation after 
receiving a tip regarding the 
presence of prostitution at a 
tanning and massage salon. In 
granting the OGC defense, the 
court considered:
That the government initiated
sexual contact and permitted 
the escalation of sexual contact 
that was not required for 
their investigation and 
collection of evidence to 
establish elements of the 
offense.
No. No.
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While many different factors were considered by courts across the 
country in their determination of successful and applicable OGC claims, the 
recognized commonality is that when the government “promote[s] rather 
than detect[s] crime,” courts acknowledge that the “power of government is 
abused and directed to an end for which it was not constituted.”95
Even where states have come up with specific criteria constituting 
offensive government acts, and that activity was present, there is still no 
guarantee of a successful OGC claim.  There are many instances in which a 
government agent appears to have broken the law or engaged in illegal 
activity and the courts still denied an OGC defense.  While it is not directly 
evident why, three plausible explanations exist: (1) the harder the crime is to 
detect, the more relaxed courts are in approving or overlooking government 
action; (2) informants and agents may be weighed differently in the eyes of 
the court, i.e., informant misconduct may be reviewed more leniently; and, 
(3) some courts refuse to consider an OGC defense altogether. 
The typical OGC defense argument focuses on actions taken by law 
enforcement agents.96  Courts have generally found some types of actions do 
not rise to the level of OGC. United States v. Smith lists factual scenarios 
where OGC was denied,97 such as: undercover agents using false identities,98
supplying the contraband at issue in the offense charged,99 committing 
serious offenses during an investigation,100 introducing drugs into a prison to 
identify a distribution network,101 assisting and encouraging escape 
attempts,102 and using a heroin-using prostitute whose own activities were 
 95.  Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384.
 96.  However, even if actions by a law enforcement agency do not constitute “engineering a 
criminal enterprise,” this ground for dismissal does not foreclose the possibility that malum in se
acts by a prosecutor may be “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense 
of justice.” United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991).  Because “[d]ismissing an 
indictment with prejudice encroaches on the prosecutor’s charging authority,” these sanctions are 
only permitted “in cases of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct.”  United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 
1088, 1090 (1991). This Note focuses, however, on actions by law enforcement, rather than 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
 97.  Smith, 924 F.2d at 897; see also United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 
1999) (“numerous courts stand for the proposition that supplying drugs or money or equipment or 
even all of these does not give rise to outrageous conduct violative of due process.”).   
 98.  See Shaw v. Winters, 796 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marcello, 
731 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 99.  Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489 (1976).  
 100.  United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 101.  United States v. Wiley, 794 F.2d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 102.  United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1992).   
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under investigation, and regularly having intercourse with the defendant.103
These courts readily excused government error or merely frowned upon 
blunders exceeding permissible bounds, yet held average citizens to higher 
standards for their faults. 
There is a connection between the type of scheme, the government’s 
involvement therein, and the level of trust required to carry it out in terms of 
a court’s willingness to forgive government conduct.  This is ironic, as courts 
are more accepting of egregious government behavior when the government 
is involved in a scheme where convictions are more difficult to secure.  For 
example, heavy government involvement in drug manufacturing schemes 
seems to be more permissible than heavy government involvement in drug 
sales.  This is because “members of a drug manufacturing ring, who already 
have access to the necessary materials and expertise, will likely be wary of 
allowing a stranger to join the conspiracy.”104  It is only after an agent has 
built up trust by providing necessary materials or financing that he may “gain 
the conspirators’ confidence to obtain sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction on a manufacturing charge.”105  Drug dealers, however, may be 
more prepared to make sales to anyone willing to make a purchase, including 
inadvertently selling to government informants by virtue of interest in profit. 
Similarly, in many sexual inducement cases, courts have not granted an 
OGC defense when it would otherwise appear to have been justified.  
Perhaps, this can be attributed to the high level of government involvement 
required to ensure that government participation remains undetected, even if 
the end result includes engaging in sexual activity on multiple occasions.106
However, there are many scenarios where it appears that the court erred in 
 103.  United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465–71 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 104.  § 5.4(c) Government “overinvolvement” in a criminal enterprise, 2 Crim. Proc. § 5.4(c) 
(4th ed.).  
 105.  Id. This creates an incentive for informants to engage in deception and fabrication to gain 
a suspects confidence. 
 106.  The court should consider the changing times, and the societal implications of the 
#MeToo Movement.  Particularly, in the last two years, there has been an influx of individuals, 
mostly women, taking a stand against inappropriate sexual conduct and, society is backing them.  
Justice Ginsburg detailed her own experiences with sexual harassment and expressed, “[i]t’s about 
time. For so long women were silent thinking there was nothing you could do about it, but now the 
law is on the side of women, or men, who encounter harassment and that’s a good thing.” Justice 
Ginsburg Details Her Own Harassment: ‘For So Long, Women Were Silent,’ DAILY BEAST (Jan. 
2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/justice-ginsburg-details-her-own-harassment-for-so-long-
women-were-silent.
While sting operations are a bit different, the same theory applies and courts should do their part 
by following suit to protect individuals from harassment, especially in extreme cases.  
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making a determination that overlooks the use of sexual leverage.107  Recall 
United v. Simpson in which the FBI chose to “manipulate” Miller, a 
prostitute, who was also a heroin user and a Canadian fugitive facing drug 
charges, into becoming an informant.108  The government continued to use 
Miller even after learning that she became sexually involved with the 
defendant.109  Furthermore, the FBI kept her on as an informant after learning 
that Miller continued to use heroin and engage in prostitution unrelated to 
and during their investigation.110  The court held that despite these factors, 
the conduct was not so outrageous to warrant a reversal of the indictment.111
Similarly, in United States v. Ornelas-Rodriguez, the court refused to dismiss 
the defendant’s conviction on the ground that a DEA officer had sexual 
intercourse with the defendant’s girlfriend, despite evidence that indicated 
the girlfriend would have cooperated with the government, irrespective of 
sexual activity with the officer.112  Consequently, the officer’s intercourse 
with the defendant’s girlfriend was not necessary for the sake of prosecution.  
In both cases, the court condoned the deception and sexual exploitation by a 
government officer and informant in the pursuit of prosecution.  While courts 
may excuse certain acts by informants due to the deceptive nature of their 
use, unnecessary benefits, such as having sex with a target beyond the scope 
of the investigation or skimming $10,000 from a drug sale is self-serving 
misconduct that should not be endorsed by courts in the United States.  
Likewise, the government should not be in the business of rewarding its 
agents or informants with sexual gratification.113  However, in various 
scenarios, the courts continue to overlook shocking fact patterns as they have 
done here. 
 107.  See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991) (deciding that a hearing was 
not necessary, despite the defendant’s raised OGC motion based on the government’s informant’s 
sexual engagement with her, on at least fifteen occasions, to assist with his inquiries regarding her 
suspected narcotics trafficking.  The sexual relations included gift giving, love letters from the 
informant, and inducement for her to enter the U.S. by getting her a visa and paying her way; see
also United States v. Dyess, 478 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2007) (where the government’s lead investigator 
had a sexual relationship with the original defendant, and where the OGC defense raised by the 
defendant was denied).
 108.  Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1464.  
 109.  Id.
 110.  Id.
 111.  Id.
 112.  United States v. Ornelas-Rodriguez, 12 F.3d 1339, 1349 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 113.  After all, no one likes getting “screwed” by the government.  
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A.  Agents vs. Informants.
Courts weighing the egregiousness of government conduct may hinge, 
to some degree, on whether the government actor was an agent or an 
informant.114  While there are a few cases115 where an informant was used 
and an OGC defense was granted, there are many cases where the reverse is 
true.  Courts may be more willing to justify the informant’s conduct because
“informant misconduct is the most common type and it is hard for the court 
to pay much attention [to it].  Because if you didn’t deal with scummy people 
as informants, then you wouldn’t be able to prosecute cases.”116  The 
inherently deceptive nature of informants is problematic when the 
government heavily relies on them for undercover investigations.  If the 
government is more accepting of acts performed by informants than by 
agents, law enforcement becomes incentivized to use and misuse informants 
excessively, knowing that such misuse may face less judicial scrutiny.  Thus, 
government misconduct would appear to be directly related to the degree of 
judicial scrutiny applied. 
B.  Refusal by Some Courts to Consider the Defense
No matter the facts, an OGC defense may fail simply because a court 
will not consider it.  Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that an 
OGC claim “is not one this circuit recognizes.”117  No matter how outrageous 
the government conduct, these federal appellate courts will not consider 
barring prosecution.118  The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are comprised of the 
following states, respectively: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.119  Of these states, Michigan is the only 
state that employs the objective entrapment defense test.120  In other words, 
 114.  Defendant has a much better chance if a government agent was involved in the act rather 
than an informant working for the government.  
 115.  See supra notes 83–92.
 116.  Telephone Interview with Karen Snell, supra note 67.   
 117.  United States v. Gustin, 642 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 118.  See United States v. Wright, No. 93-4228, 1995 WL 101300, at *3 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding the Sixth Circuit will not consider an OGC defense, “[T]his court has held that even if the 
government’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ it does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process.”).
 119.  Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United States District 
Courts, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1. 
pdf.
 120.  There are eleven total states that use the entrapment test nationwide: Alaska, Arkansas, 
California, Hawaii, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and 
Vermont.  PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE n.4 (4th ed. 2012).  
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six out of the seven states within these circuits where the OGC defense is 
“stillborn”121 use the subjective entrapment defense.  Because the OGC 
defense and the objective entrapment test both focus on the egregiousness of 
government conduct, Michigan’s defendants facing criminal prosecution are 
likely protected, despite the Circuits’ refusal to recognize the OGC defense.  
For the rest of these six states, there is little protection for defendants 
predisposed to the crimes for which they are charged, even if egregious 
government activity is involved.  This notion runs counter to Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sherman, and fundamental concepts of due 
process of law, which motivate the importance of confronting this very 
issue.122  Furthermore, even among the states that recognize the OGC 
defense, there are no clear guidelines to determine its applicability. 
What do lower court decisions tell us about the viability of the OGC 
defense in the Supreme Court?  Perhaps, the Court does not want to touch 
the defense because it perceives lower courts as successfully applying the 
defense where they see fit.  Alternatively, perhaps the prosecution recognizes 
that the courts’ granting of the OGC defense would have detrimental effects 
on public perception of law enforcement and, therefore, will do what it can 
to prevent exposure of egregious conduct by law enforcement.  Under these 
circumstances, courts would rarely be presented with the opportunity to 
adjudicate the OGC defense.
Long-time San Francisco defense counsel Karen Snell agrees: “the 
government doesn’t really want the case [where their agents have committed 
egregious acts] to go forward.  I have asked prosecutors, ‘do you really want 
this to be in the public eye?’  That is a useful tool to get a good deal for the 
client.  But really, it’s a lot about who your judge is.”123  Given the direct 
relationship between law enforcement misconduct and judicial scrutiny 
thereof, it is likely that prosecutors’ exercise of discretion will be equally 
affected by judicial scrutiny. Prosecutorial recognition that law enforcement 
conduct has gone beyond the pale may lead to a plea deal,124 such that no 
substantive opinion addressing OGC is ever written.125  Those are the 
defense success stories. 
 121.  United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 122.  Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 371, 378–85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
 123.  Telephone Interview with Karen Snell, supra note 67.   
 124.  The increase in plea deals is presumed to be largely a result of extremely high penalties, 
that is sentences, associated with infractions. Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534 
171.
 125.  See infra note 175.  
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But as we have seen, there are cases where courts have inexplicably 
denied an OGC defense.126  Furthermore, apart from cases where courts may 
have denied the OGC defense even though the facts clearly warranted a 
reversal of conviction, we are reminded of those courts that will not even 
consider the defense.127  These cases especially present a need for Supreme 
Court oversight, leadership, and guidance.  Of course, there are cases where 
juries may “improperly” decide cases.  Yet, in cases such as these, where 
there is no substantial evidence such that a jury could make a finding, judicial 
oversight can serve to correct mistakes.  When the problem lies with those 
in power at the judicial level, where there is largely a consensus with regard 
to OGC, there are few protections for defendants at the hands of law 
enforcement acting in ways that courts deem not be to sufficiently 
outrageous, but that are indeed egregious.
III.  Supreme Court Cases Where the OGC Defense has Been 
Raised and Failed 
Two prominent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Russell and 
Hampton v. United States, address and support the viability of an OGC 
defense.  Though squarely presented with case facts addressing this very 
principle, the Court did not grant the defense in either case and has not done 
so since. 
In Russell, the defendant was arrested as part of an undercover operation 
in the investigation of the manufacturing of methamphetamine.128  An 
undercover officer supplied the defendant with phenyl-2-propanone, a 
chemical and necessary ingredient, for the manufacture in exchange for half 
of the drugs produced.129 While the chemical was difficult to obtain, there 
were other means to access it, which the defendant made clear to the officer, 
given he had previously produced three pounds.130  In his defense, the 
defendant requested that the Court consider the entrapment theory, resting 
on constitutional grounds.131  He argued that the high level of government 
 126.  See generally United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Cordae Black, 750 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (Noonan, J., dissenting).  
 127.  E.g., the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.  
 128.  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424 (1973).  
 129.  Id.
 130.  Id. at 425.  
 131.  Russell was likely inspired by Justice Frankfurter’s comment in his Sherman concurrence 
that “the federal courts have an obligation to set their face against enforcement of the law by lawless 
means or means that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice.” Sherman v. United States, 
356 U.S 371, 380 (1958).
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participation violated his due process rights.  The Court held that they “may 
someday be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law 
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction, [], the instant case is distinctly not of that breed.”132  The Court 
did not overrule and decided, by a small margin,133 to proceed with the 
subjective theory adopted in Sorrells.  Their argument was that because the 
substance alone was harmless, legal, and obtainable without government 
participation, the conduct did not reach the level necessary to violate the 
“fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice” that the 
Fifth Amendment of the Due Process Clause mandates.134
Several years later in Hampton,135 a defendant was convicted for selling 
heroin to a government agent, supplied to him by a government informant.136
As in Russell, the Court in Hampton determined the entrapment defense 
failed because of the defendant’s predisposition.  The defendant alleged in 
his defense that the supplying of contraband by the government violated his 
due process rights, amounting to OGC.137  The majority held that when a 
defendant is predisposed to commit a crime both the entrapment and due 
process defenses will fail.138  The majority opinion suggests that when a 
defendant is predisposed to commit a crime, such that the entrapment defense 
is not available to him, he is left no remedy to combat egregious acts by the 
government.  Justice Rehnquist, joined in the majority opinion by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice White, wrote, “the remedy of the criminal 
defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents . . . lies solely in the 
defense of entrapment.”139  However, “the issue goes beyond the conviction 
of the individual defendant. At stake is the integrity of the process.”140  It is 
ironic that Justice Rehnquist made this assertion, considering his famous 
declaration in Russell.141
While the majority did not find for the defendant, the case is unique in 
that six justices recognized the existence and the availability of a defense 
 132.  Russell, 411 U.S. at 431. 
 133.  The Court split 5-4 in favor of the government.  
 134.  Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.  
 135.  The Court split 5-3.  Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).   
 136.  Id.
 137.  Id.
 138.  Id. at 488–89.  
 139.  Id. at 490.  
 140.  David L. Lewis, 4 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 86.04 (2018).   
 141.  United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
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based solely on government conduct.142  Justice Powell in his concurrence, 
joined by Justice Blackmun, expressed disagreement with the majority 
opinion and concluded that a rule should not be imposed precluding the 
possibility of a bar to prosecution based on due process principles, where 
there is egregious law enforcement activity.143  In his dissent, Justice 
Brennan expressed his agreement, concluding “that Russell does not 
foreclose imposition of a bar to conviction based upon our supervisory power 
or even due process principles where the conduct of law enforcement 
authorities is sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to 
invoke such a defense might be ‘predisposed.’”144 Despite the outcome, 
Hampton recognized that the OGC defense should be made available when 
the conduct of government agents is so outrageous that it offends due 
process, even though the majority found that the facts presented here did not 
meet this standard.145  The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the value of 
the OGC defense and left open the door to apply the defense when the facts 
presented fit. 
A.  Reasons Why the Supreme Court has Not Yet Granted the OGC 
Defense
The Supreme Court has not yet granted the OGC defense because the 
Court believes it has not been presented with facts that warrant granting of 
the motion.  Furthermore, there is little case law presenting an OGC motion 
that has made its way to the Supreme Court.  In the rare instances it has, the 
justices of the Court have collectively rejected the OGC defense.  This may 
be in part due to the phenomenom of the law as a distinct cultural system146
paired with the absence of structure of the OGC defense.  The combination 
thereof induces paralysis, making it harder for judges and justices to decide 
what government behavior or actions are over the top.147
 142.  See generally MARCUS, supra note 120.  The three dissenting justices agreed with Justice 
Powell: a due process defense was available where the government’s conduct was particularly 
egregious. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497.  These justices agreed that a defendant’s predisposition 
“cannot possibly justify the action of government officials in purposefully creating the crime.”  Id.
at 498–99.  
 143.  Hampton, 425 U.S. at 484.   
 144.  Id. at 497.  
 145.  See generally id. at 484. 
 146.  See infra note 148. 
 147.  There is no consensus regarding what constitutes “outrageous,” what is reasonable, and 
which actions are not tolerated by the government.
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The anthropological theory of the law of the courts as a distinct cultural 
system148 suggests that “if the law that the courts make and apply is a distinct 
cultural system . . . then sensitivity to trends in the law and the ability to 
correctly assess the relative weight of law’s many elements are indispensable 
[to] making persuasive legal arguments.”149  In other words, the choice for 
justices to accept the defense is not really a choice at all.  While justices take 
the bench as unique individuals with their own interpretations and 
perspectives, there is still some degree of “objectivity in the law (i.e., that a 
justice cannot resolve a case any way he or she wishes but is severely 
constrained by the legal culture within which he or she is operating).”150  That 
is to say, while of course it “is impossible to eliminate a [justice’s] unique 
personality, character, life experience, and cultural background from the 
[justice’s] legal decision making,”151 a justice’s decision to consider granting 
an OGC defense may be stifled, despite a belief that it should be conceivable. 
The idea of the law as a distinct cultural system stems from prominent 
scholar Karl Llewellyn, who “played an important role in refuting legal 
formalism.”152  He posited that the law has repetitive arguments and methods 
of thinking.153  And, “lawyers internalize the contents of the law and the 
modes of thinking and arguments prevalent in the law and therefore these 
contents and modes not only pervasively structure the way lawyers function 
in the law but also severely constrain the options available to them.”154
Justice Rehnquist in Russell notes the possibility that someday the OGC 
defense might be accepted.  However, the current trend suggests that this 
possibility is unlikely to come to fruition.  While the opportunity remains for 
justices to make the decision to acquit or overturn a conviction based on the 
defense, Llewellyn’s theory is that “lawyers that operate within the same 
legal system will act in a similar fashion, and there will be no far-reaching 
variety in their conduct when they handle similar legal problems.”155
Perhaps the Court has not applied the OGC defense because change is 
difficult.  It may be even more difficult when the choice is not left open to 
 148.  The theory generally expresses the notion that there is an objective way to rule on the law 
and that precedent governs.  Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 839, 855 (2011).  
 149.  Id. at 856–57.  
 150.  Id. at 860. 
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id. at 859.  
 153.  Mautner, supra note 148, at 859.
 154.  Id.
 155.  Id.
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juries, but is instead delegated to judges156 who may fall victim to this 
cultural phenomenon.  The insulated cultural system that this theory posits 
makes it easier for justices to follow suit in denying a raised OGC motion, 
asserting that the facts presented do not meet the standard.  After all, 
following precedent often protects the legitimacy of the law, but “precedent 
alone cannot guide the way—even for those justices who steer by precedent 
as their polestar because precedent in this field is so regularly contradictory 
or perverse.”157
Apart from precedent, justices may fear public scrutiny and ridicule, 
which serve as deterrents to accepting a defense that has yet to be resolutely 
accepted and applied.  The integrity of the Court is something to which Chief 
Justice Roberts has devoted a substantial amount of time because it matters 
to him, and others, what people think.158  Llewellyn’s theory supplements 
this proposition and recognizes that “other people active in the [justices’] 
professional culture constantly review judges’ opinions: other [justices], 
lawyers, law professors and law students.  Readers of court opinions react 
positively to opinions that abide by the norms prevalent among lawyers, and 
react negatively to opinions that deviate from what is customary.”159  So 
while courts may have greater flexibility to grant an OGC defense and 
believe it should remain a possibility, perhaps, the fear of public criticism 
has surmounted the bravery required to make change for the last forty-five 
years.160
B.  Critics Assert the Defense has Not Been Accepted
Alternatively, some assert that the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the 
defense is merely theoretical.  These critics contend that because the Court 
has not found facts that meet the OGC standard, justices do not accept the 
defense nor believe in its longevity.161  These critics are in the “never say 
never” camp.162  This may be in part due to the belief that there is no need 
for the OGC defense because other doctrines, such as entrapment or 
 156.  Due to the procedural nature of the defense.
 157.  AMAR 1997, supra note 58, at 149.
 158.  Joan Biskupic, In Partisan Times, Chief Justice Worries About the Court’s Image, CNN
POL. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/politics/john-roberts-image-gerrymanderin 
g-redistricting/index.html.
 159.  Mautner, supra note 148, at 859.   
 160.  Since the defense was raised as a possibility in Russell. See supra note 118. 
 161.  United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1424–25 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussions of the 
defense are no more than “dicta,” given that relief is never granted). 
 162.  Marc D. Esterow, Lead Us Not Into Temptation: Stash House Stings And The Outrageous 
Government Conduct Defense, 8 DREXEL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 17 (2015).  
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duress,163 address the problem of defending the personal interests of 
defendants.164  Or, perhaps, because of their belief that it is the job of the 
legislature and not the Court to establish the scope of legitimate government 
action.165
However, as highlighted throughout this Note, the entrapment defense 
used by the majority of courts does not entirely address the problem of 
defending the personal interests of defendants.166  It is important that the 
Supreme Court, rather than Congress, accept and recognize the OGC defense 
because of the extensive ways in which law enforcement could engage in 
conduct that no rational actor might have considered possible.  Otherwise, 
Congress would need to posit every idiotic, harebrained, cruel or unusual, 
idea or concept that agents of the government (police and authorities) could 
engage in.167  It is the same reason why the courts, and not Congress, 
determine what is “cruel and unusual”168 under the Eighth Amendment.  This 
 163.  However, there is specific need for the OGC defense in the majority of courts using the 
subjective entrapment test, in cases where a defendant is predisposed to commit a crime, yet the 
government has acted egregiously.  
 164.  See e.g., United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to bury the 
defense but calling it “moribund” and refusing to apply it in the present scenario); see also Bank of 
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254–56 (1988); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 
66, 72–73 (1986) (where the Supreme Court reminds us that reversing convictions should be saved 
for situations when the irresponsible acts by government agents have caused prejudice to a 
recognized legal right of a defendant and not for situations when the government has just acted 
irresponsibly).
 165.  Cf. Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“Courts 
have an interest in preventing their processes from being used to legitimize and perpetuate offensive 
executive conduct, in assuring public confidence in the administration of law.”).  Hence, those who 
push for the OGC defense are “not so much usurpers of legislative authority as guardians of the 
judicial process.”  United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2013).  
 166.  See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (“a test that makes the entrapment 
defense depend on whether the defendant had the requisite predisposition permits the introduction 
into evidence of all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor–all of which would be inadmissible in 
any other context–in order to prove the defendant's predisposition.”).  
 167.  See also Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (“But to look to a statute for guidance in the application 
of a policy not remotely within the contemplation of Congress at the time of its enactment is to 
distort analysis.  It is to run the risk, furthermore, that the court will shirk the responsibility that is 
necessarily in its keeping, if Congress is truly silent, to accommodate the dangers of overzealous 
law enforcement and civilized methods adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals.  The 
reasons that actually underlie the defense of entrapment can too easily be lost sight of in the pursuit 
of a wholly fictitious congressional intent.”).  
 168.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972) (outlining the four principles the Court 
used to determine whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual).   
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holds true, at least in the first instance, because Congress has the power to 
pass laws to override the Court’s ruling if it wishes.169
The Due Process Clause already outlines a general framework within 
which to understand permissible conduct by condemning governmental 
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”170  The 
OGC defense delves deeper to target the specific framework that the Due 
Process Clause generally attempts to address.  Although there are no clear 
guidelines as to what constitutes OGC, the Court is fully empowered to 
interpret the Constitution.  And it is the Court’s job to determine when the 
government has exceeded its power and entered this realm. 
C.  Reforming Procedural Barriers to the OGC Defense
Reforming the procedural barriers often applicable to the OGC defense 
might allow for it to remain available as a meaningful option for defendants 
and their attorneys.  Currently, the OGC defense is usually decided in a pre-
trial motion and is a bar to prosecution, resulting in the reversal or dismissal 
of an indictment.171  Judges can decide the raised motion before hearing all 
the facts and evidence, but it is rare that they are unable to do so, such that 
the consideration of the defense is left to trial.  But what if the OGC defense 
could first be presented at trial?  Modifying the way in which the OGC 
defense can be raised, procedurally, may allow for the availability of reduced 
sanctions, including diminished risks posed to defendants rasising the OGC 
defense, especially pretrial.172 Making this procedural change, and therefore, 
lowering the stakes, might allow for increased acceptance of the defense. 
D.  Remedies: What Remedies are Available to the Court Upon a 
Finding of OGC and the Granting of the OGC Defense Motion?
A successful OGC claim, would not have to be an all or nothing 
decision—a judge could consider a diminution in charges or the sentence, 
 169.  See Lilly M. Ledbetter v. The Good-Year Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 
643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Legislature may act to correct this.”); But see Can 
Congress over-ride a Supreme Court decision, THE ECONOMIST (July 28, 2015), https://www.eco 
nomist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/07/rights-and-legislation (if we view OGC as 
protected by the Constitution, then Congress will not be permitted to make corrections because 
“Congress is not entitled to scale back on rights the Supreme Court says are protected by the 
constitution.”).
 170.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.
 171.  Kenneth M. Miller, Outrageous Government Conduct that Shocks the Conscience, CAL.
ATT’YS FOR CRIM. JUST. 81, 83 no. 4 (1998). 
 172.  See supra note 41. 
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rather than the narrow alternative of barring prosecution altogether.173  In 
addition to expanding the possibilities for outcomes on a successful OGC 
claim, this procedural change would allow jurors, along with judges, to 
weigh into the decision-making process for a more objective and potentially 
fair outcome.  Consider the words of a Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist in a 
1787 essay: 
If a federal constable [searching] for stolen goods, pulled down 
the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman and searched 
under her shift . . . a trial by jury would be our safest resource, 
heavy damage would at once punish the offender and deter others 
from committing the same; but what satisfaction can we expect 
from a lordly [judge] always ready to protect the officer. 174
The same idea applies to some degree today.  Anticipating the notion of 
the law as a distinct cultural system, we are aware of the factors that some 
judges consider in making decisions.  These factors extend beyond just the 
facts of the case at hand to matters like precedent and the court’s own image.  
Allowing jurors the opportunity to make this finding175 and judges to choose 
the consequence—a reversal of conviction or diminution of charges—would 
balance the process and protect defendants from cultural or other 
unpredictable phenomena.  After all, it is crucial that these considerations 
are made as “we continue to believe that the law will prove itself adequate 
to the task of preventing the government from going too far.  In the war on 
 173.  This concept is like sentencing entrapment, where a defendant’s sentence may be 
reduced, if he was predisposed to commit a lesser offense, but with the government’s inducement, 
he engaged in a crime requiring harsher punishment.  See generally United States v. Staufer, 38 
F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 174.  AMAR 1997, supra note 58, at 14.
 175.  John De Lorean was an internationally renowned millionaire automaker, who was 
arrested for drug trafficking cocaine, because of a successful FBI sting operation.  Kevin Hackett, 
Entrapment, De Lorean and the Undercover Operation: A Constitutional Connection, 18 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 365, 366 (1985).  At his trial, both the entrapment and due process defenses 
were raised, and De Lorean was acquitted by a jury on all charges.  Id.  There is no opinion on this 
case, which suggests two things: (1) in the rare circumstance where a motion to dismiss based on 
OGC is not decided by the judge pretrial, the defense can be raised at trial and may be left to the 
discretion of the jury.  Perhaps, a finding of “overzealous law enforcement practice which portend 
an erosion of individual liberty and the emergence of an Orwellian police state,” as was found here, 
is due to the jury’s rather than the judges’ consideration of the due process violation allegation.  Id. 
at 367.  And, (2) in cases where the defense is granted, there may be no opinion on which courts 
can rely, such that the paper trail of successful claims is lost.  
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crime, as in conventional warfare, some tactics simply cannot be tolerated 
by a civilized society.”176
IV.  The Supreme Court’s Acceptance of the OGC Defense is 
Consistent with the Original Intent of the Framers of the 
Constitution 
It may well have been the Framers’ intent in writing the Constitution 
and in looking to the underpinnings of the Due Process Clause that an OGC 
defense stand muster.  The Framers were fifty-five men appointed as 
delegates of the original thirteen colonies and sent by their respective state 
legislatures to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 to 
amend the Articles of Confederation.177  Instead, they drafted the 
Constitution, which replaced the Articles.178  A few years later, the “Most 
Significant Framer of the New Nation,”179 James Madison, wrote The Bill of 
Rights comprised of amendments to the Constitution.  States had insisted on 
the addition of the Amendments and had ratified the Constitution180 on the 
promise that these Amendments would be subsequently added.181
A.  A Historical Constitutional Analysis: We Should Accept an OGC 
Defense
Why is the consideration of the Amendments important?  It shows that 
outrageous government conduct was a matter of such concern to the states 
during the constitutional period that the Framers agreed to address it in the 
body of the Constitution.  After all, in drafting the Constitution it was the 
intent of the Framers to prevent the establishment of the same kind of tyranny 
from which they were escaping, namely, the British Crown.182  In drafting 
 176.  United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 177.  Introduction to the Framers of the Constitution, CENTER FOR CIVIC EDUCATION, http:// 
www.civiced.org/introduction-to-the-framers-of-the-constitution?mid=1160.  
 178.  Id.
 179.  James Madison-Framer of a New Nation, AWESOME STORIES (Oct. 7, 2013),  https:// 
www.awesomestories.com/asset/view/James-Madison-Framer-of-a-New-Nation//1.
 180.  The Amendments were approved by Congress in 1791 and remain intact today.  Report 
of the United States of America Submitted to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights In 
Conjunction with the Universal Periodic Review, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://www.s 
tate.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf. 
 181.  KATHLEEN SULLIVAN AND NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (19th ed. 2016).   
 182.  “The concept of ‘liberty’ was recognized as encompassing not only freedom from 
physical restraint, but also freedom from undue government intrusion into such fundamental 
personal decisions as whether to bear or beget a child or how to raise and educate one’s children.” 
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the Constitution, and the later Amendments, the Framers’ aim was to ensure 
there were limited restraints on individual freedom183 and limited federal 
government powers.184  While they may not have used the words “OGC,” 
the very actions that concerned them are analogous to the actions that 
comprise OGC today. 
1.  The Framer’s Intent in Writing the Amendments 
The Amendments were a direct reaffirmation of each citizen’s 
inalienable rights.  The Amendments were made to protect against what the 
Framers deemed to be outrageous acts by the federal government.  For 
example, the Third Amendment, “no soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war 
but in a manner prescribed by law,”185 was likely adopted because the 
Framers believed that the forcible quartering of troops in the homes of British 
individuals was outrageous.  Similarly, the Fourth Amendment, “the right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures,”186 was likely adopted to protect against 
governmental actors’ abuse of private space.  “The Framers feared that 
governmental actors would abuse their offices . . . that searches (other than 
routine customs inspections) required individualized cause or suspicion . . . 
[and] searches of structures required a warrant.”187  The Fourth Amendment 
was motivated by British commanders searching entire neighborhoods and 
entering homes at will.188
In a 1760s English cause celebre, Crown henchmen lacking 
proper legal authorization invaded the home of John Wilkes, 
rummaged through his papers, and grabbed his person.  Wilkes 
was a leading opposition politician, and the Crown was trying to 
find evidence to charge him with the crime of having 
anonymously authored an antigovernment essay . . . No 
Geoffrey Stone, The Framers’ Constitution, DEMOCRACY, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/ 
21/the-framers-constitution/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
183. Their proposed structure is diametrically opposed to the system they sought freedom 
from.
 184.  Stone, supra note 182.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. III.  
186. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 187.  Thomas K. Clancy, The Framer’s Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 980, 984 & n.24 (2011).  
 188.  The History Behind the 4th Amendment, SWINDLE L. GROUP, P.C. (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.swindlelaw.com/2013/03/the-history-behind-the-4th-amendment/.
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incriminating items were found in the search, and Wilkes 
successfully sued the henchmen in tort, winning large civil 
damages designed to deter future government misconduct.189
The court sensed here that the actions of government agents were 
outrageous and they sought remedy for the victims.  “The Founders 
obviously ratified and drafted the Fourth Amendment with the Wilkes 
litigation in mind.”190  The focus was on conduct by government officials 
that was deemed outrageous.  They recognized that it was not proper for the 
government to intrude on the private space of another.  When the government 
violated this principle and obtained information that would have otherwise 
been unavailable had they not, the Court recognized, like in Kyllo v. United 
States191 that a reversal of conviction was appropriate.  Likewise, the Framers 
likely recognized the importance of drafting the Sixth Amendment and 
giving protections to the accused when considering the breadth of potential 
OGC that individuals might face. 
“Consider next the nice-sounding idea that government should not 
profit from its own wrongdoing.”192  That is perhaps one factor that the 
Framers considered and were motivated by in writing the Amendments, 
specifically, regarding their general outrage against actions taken by the 
British in various contexts.  Conceivably, in writing the Amendments, the 
Framers were most concerned with OGC.  As such, the Framers wrote the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to be all encompassing,193
thereby embracing all unfathomable contexts to which OGC might apply. 
2.  The OGC Defense Is a Constituent Part of the Fifth Amendment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows us the 
opportunity to “self-consciously consult principles embodied in other parts 
of the Constitution to flesh out the concrete meaning of constitutional
189. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1st ed. 2015). 
 190.  Id.
 191.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (government used thermal imaging to find the 
defendant growing marijuana inside his home.  This was information that otherwise would’ve been 
unavailable, had the government not overstepped their bounds.).
 192.  AMAR 1997, supra note 58, at 26. 
 193.  The Due Process Clauses promises “an assurance that all levels of American government 
must operate within the law (“legality”) and provide fair procedures.”  Peter Strauss, Due Process,
CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2018).  
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reasonableness.”194  It centers on the proposition that no person “shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”195  Like the 
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was motivated by the Framers’ concerns about outrageous acts 
of the Crown against British subjects, which resulted in indictments or 
convictions.  “The use of such open-ended provisions would indicate that the 
framers did not want the Constitution to become a straitjacket on all events 
for all times.”196  The Framers meant to address this broad proposition of not 
accepting outrageous conduct, with the idea that while change would come, 
this fundamental theory should not.  After all, there was no need to write a 
general clause, similar to the Due Process Clause, if they believed it covered 
all of the specifics.  There was no way for the Framers to predict the future 
and prevent against all harm.  However, the Framers knew that the 
foundations of the Due Process Clause would serve as an overarching 
principle that could address nonspecific outrageousness long beyond their 
lifetimes.197
Thus, there is an original intent basis for SCOTUS to adopt the OGC 
defense.  The fundamental principles inherent in the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution and the basis for its articulation are the same very principles 
underpinning an OGC defense.  As noted, the Framers focused on and 
fundamentally rejected pernicious acts of the Sovereign when implementing 
the various Constitutional provisions and Amendments, and in deriving the 
Due Process Clause.  The OGC defense is the heir to the Framers’ rejection 
of the actions taken by the Crown against British and American citizens and, 
as such, an intrinsic part of the Fifth Amendment. 
Adopting the OGC defense would not be a drastic change but rather 
would be a minor one for the Court to accomplish.  There is no need for a 
reversal of stare decisis.  Instead, the Court need only further develop what 
it has already been set forth.  This is exactly what the Framers would have 
wanted and is something that those justices who focus on originalism (the 
“originalists”) might find compelling, as “[j]udges who value long-run 
 194.  Strauss, supra note 193, at 3.  
 195.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 196.  Irving R. Kaufman, What Did the Founding Fathers Intend? N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/23/magazine/what-did-the-founding-fathers-intend.html?page 
wanted=all.
 197.  Traditional notions of substantive due process rely on this historical framework and have 
been embraced.  
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stability and sustainability should prefer institutions that connect the People 
to our Constitution, rather than ones that alienate Us from it.”198
It is not far reaching to assert that the originalists on the Supreme Court, 
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts, would 
demand some historical evidence that the Framers would have nullified a 
conviction based on a finding that particular government conduct was 
egregious.  Such judicial recourse is rooted in what Madison referred to in 
Federalist Paper No. 51, as the “necessity of auxiliary precautions” or 
“internal or external controls” on government, that “oblige [the government] 
to control itself.”199
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks 
and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of 
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all 
reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.  
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige 
it to control itself.  A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.200
Hamilton, too, in Federalist Paper No. 23, considered the need for 
government institutions to ensure and protect constitutional safeguards and 
check abuse, in case we have “[a] government, the constitution of which 
renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to 
delegate to any government, [which thus] would be an unsafe and improper 
depository of the NATIONAL INTERESTS.”201  Indeed, as John Philip 
Reid, the esteemed legal historian and professor, has noted, “[r]ights we tend 
to think of today as criminal procedure safeguards—such as those against 
self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures—mostly derived 
from particular episodes in eighteenth century England in which the 
 198.  AMAR 1997, supra note 58, at 30–31. 
 199.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 200.  Id.
 201.  Id.
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government had targeted political or religious dissidents.”202  Professor Reid 
continues:
Constitutional protection of the right to a jury trial was partly 
responsive to the British practice of using vice-admiralty courts, 
which operated without juries, to prosecute colonial smugglers, 
whom local jurors were often reluctant to convict.  The right to 
freedom of the press was partly responsive to the 1735 episode in 
which the royal governor of New York had brought a seditious 
libel prosecution to suppress criticism of his administration by 
colonial publisher John Peter Zenger.203
Thus, the OGC defense is a natural and intrinsic derivation of the Due 
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, a constitutional precaution or 
control that engenders public trust in the Constitution. It is also a check on 
governmental abuse and a defense against the outrageous targeting of 
citizens, even those predisposed to criminality by agents of the government. 
Conclusion
For years, courts have swept apparent due process violations under the 
rug.  “These cases demonstrate the government’s willingness to infringe 
upon values of equality, fairness, and liberty . . . and to employ law 
enforcement tactics that cross the line established by the Due Process 
Clause.”204  This is in large part due to the lack of clarity and definitiveness 
of the criteria that courts use to consider a raised OGC defense.  As 
discussed, the criteria to establish grounds for the acceptance of an OGC 
defense is not outlined in most jurisdictions and its applicability is 
determined on a case-by-case basis such that, theoretically, it could be all 
encompassing.  However, while the lack of structure may appear to expand 
a court’s breadth as to what could constitute a due process violation, it has 
had the reverse effect.  The absence of uniform guidelines has induced 
paralysis and has led to the subsequent dismissal of many cases that have 
come before courts nationwide.  Just as the law as a distinct cultural system 
theory posits, judges and the courts err on the side of institutional 
conservatism, shying away from the bravery required to overcome paralysis 
 202.  MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 580 (2016).  
 203.  Id.
 204.  United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 313 (9th Cir. 2013) (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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and grant OGC relief.205—a catch-22.  The Supreme Court, and several lower 
courts, including the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit, have expressly 
acknowledged the viability of an OGC defense and have asserted that the 
defense shall be maintained.  However, few courts have granted relief for 
those defendants who assert the defense “squarely upon the doctrine of 
outrageous government conduct.”206  The “banner of outrageous misconduct 
is often raised but seldom saluted.”207  The Supreme Court is no beacon, and 
the Justices presented with an OGC defense have rejected the defense in each 
case that has come before them, despite their collective assertion that the 
defense remains a constitutional option.  Eliminating the defense would give 
the government a sense of entitlement and authority to act with impunity in 
ways that run counter to the fundamental principles of fairness ingrained in 
the Constitution.  This would especially be true in the areas where defendants 
are not protected by other statutes or defenses, such as in states within the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits that do not recognize OGC and employ the 
subjective entrapment test.  The effectiveness of the OGC defense depends 
on standardization of the criteria for its application, uniformity of procedures 
for raising it, and the expansion of remedies upon granting the defense.  
These will ensure fairness to the accused, reduce institutional risks to courts, 
and establish appropriate limits for law enforcement behavior, consistent 
with the intent of the Framers as articulated in the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Epilogue
Thinking to the Future: An Increasing Need for Judicial 
Protection 
If the originalist interpretation is not in and of itself convincing, think 
to the future.  As the array of freedoms that individuals might experience or 
exercise have expanded with technological progress, so too have the 
government’s powers to regulate those freedoms.  This is true of the 
telegraph, telephone, air travel, and the Internet where widespread adoption 
by civilians has led to increased authority by federal government agencies.  
And, this will almost certainly be true of tomorrow’s technological 
developments.  With government agencies’ increasingly expansive 
 205.  See supra note 147.   
 206.  United States v. Bouchard, 886 F. Supp. 111, 115 (D. Me. 1995).  
 207.  United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st. Cir. 1993).  
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mechanisms of enforcement, comes the increased ability to abuse that 
enforcement. 
Consider the following example of using large scale data analysis to 
predict and preempt crime or predictive policing.  No individual action 
involved in predictive policing necessarily promotes scrutiny under non-
OGC claims.  In fact, the Supreme Court has already decided that the use of 
predictive data is permissible as evidence, so long as it is not the sole 
justification for prosecution.208  Taken to its extreme, however, seemingly 
permissible actions can, in the aggregate, reach an impermissible standard 
without once raising non-OGC due process alarms.  For example, consider a 
scenario in which the government were to preemptively legally collect 
evidence and DNA from all citizens to help facilitate investigations.209
Perhaps, law enforcement agencies collected garbage210 outside of 
apartments and houses and combined that information with other data points 
to establish a database containing expansive personal information about each 
individual.  If this information aided the government in validating 
convictions, what then?  Just as the Fourth Amendment would not apply due 
to the public nature of the garbage, the entrapment defense would also be 
futile if the individual were predisposed to the crime for which he was 
charged.  The danger is not in the creation of the database, per se, but rather, 
how it is used.  As this admittedly extreme case demonstrates, there is not 
only a basis for, but there a need for additional protections as “a sort of hedge 
against a bleak totalitarian future.”211  As such, the OGC defense fulfills the 
role of protecting against future government abuse where other claims, such 
as entrapment, may fail. 
 208.  John Villasenor, Big Data and its threat to the Fourth Amendment, BIG DATA 
INNOVATION MAG. (June 24, 2014), http://bigdata-madesimple.com/big-data-and-its-threat-to-the-
fourth-amendment/.
209. E.g., MINORITY REPORT (Amblin Entertainment 2002) (where criminals are apprehended 
before committing crimes based on foreknowledge acquired by psychics).   
 210.  See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S 35 (1988) (holding there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in disposed goods on public streets).  
 211.  United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2013).  
